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Sovereignty or Subjugation?: Explaining Muslim States’ Aversion to Full
Ratification of CEDAW

At the moment, two competing narratives arise from the study of international
human rights treaties. First, that the reservations, understandings, and declarations
(RUD’s) made by States upon ratification appropriately account for the cultural,
religious, or political histories of the signatories, allowing each government room for
domestic implementation. A second contrary view holds that as universally applicable
principles, human rights treaties are uniquely exempt from any modification process,
which cannot be cherry picked for State preferences (Neumayer, 2007). However, despite
the merit of these arguments, such polarizing debate between cultural relativism and
universal morality does little to explain the reality that so few states fully ratify without
reservation, or address why many states continue not to adhere to the standards of
treaties. In fact, framing this division normatively encourages scholars to assign either
cultural or moral righteousness, portraying certain states as behaving in ways deemed
“right” whilst others are “wrong”. Such diagnosis creates erroneous narratives that
picture complex attitudes toward human rights unilaterally, as is the case with the gross
mischaracterization of those states with high Muslim populations in utilizing RUD’s on
treaty provisions. Of particular concern is that heated rhetoric can further inflame
diametric opposition between signatory states, rather than the desired unity human rights
treaties are meant to afford (Mahalingam, 2004).
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Instead this research paper will focus on the underlying factors that hinder the full
ratification of the foremost women’s rights treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in order to refute the prevailing
notion that all so called “Muslim states” are simplistic and uncalculating, blindly
following the immutable word of Islam and Shariah. In today’s growing hostile climate
between Muslims and non-muslims, particularly in the United States, presumptions about
the Islamic faith as fundamentally sexist and incompatible with human rights regimes
must first be proven. By dropping “should” arguments to examine general human rights
treaty roles, the nature of these reservations, and the corresponding domestic
implementation of these states, this approach seeks to challenge the dominant narrative
that religion is the sole force behind reservations in Muslim nations.
Before delving into the intricacies of CEDAW and compliance strategies of
Muslim states, it is important to first clarify how human rights treaties function at the
international level. At its simplest, a treaty can be described as any international
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law.
After World War II and the atrocities that resulted during that period, international law
shifted from its traditional role negotiating the relationships of nations, to those between
nations and their citizens (Friedman, 2005). “The punishment of war criminals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo and the desire to prevent the recurrence of such crimes against
humanity drastically changed the status of individuals under international law”, affording
individual’s universal rights and “the means for vindication of those rights on the
international plane” (Friedman). However, to allow a country to become a state party to
an international treaty in a contingent manner, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
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Treaties (VCLT) signed in 1969, prescribed a system of accession that gave states the
ability to put on record their dissatisfaction and refusal to comply with a particular treaty
provision. As mentioned previously these are known as reservations, understandings, and
declarations, which are defined in the VCLT as meaning “a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to the State.” More plainly, through
RUD’s, states are able to prescribe what provisions they will or will not choose to comply
with.
Not surprisingly then, RUD’s are more commonly found in human rights treaties
than in any other area of international treaty making as it most directly dictates how a
state should legislate and govern domestic laws (Neumayer, 2007). Other factors
contribute to the high number of RUD’s present, such as “vague language that is open to
interpretation as to its precise meaning” due to the functional desire for human rights
treaties to apply generally to all countries (Neumayer). Another factor is a lack of
“reciprocity” in human rights treaties. When ratifying other kinds of international treaty
agreements, states are concerned with what their contracting partners declare unbinding
as it could adversely affect them as parties to the same treaty. This is a holdover from the
past practice of the “unanimity rule” that mandated reservations either be accepted by all
parties or withdrawn by the disputing party in order for any treaty to be signed (Hamid,
2006). Now under the reciprocity rule, states refrain from reservations themselves,
because they would have to concede to another state’s right to reserve the same provision
(Neumayer). Human rights treaties are unique this way, because the same level of

Dissanayake 4
reciprocity in domestic behavior does not exist. If Algeria chooses to revoke a woman’s
right to initiate divorce it does not directly affect divorce rights in Germany.
Consequently, “international human rights regimes are comparatively weak to say,
regimes of finance and trade” as there are “no competitive market forces…nor are there
strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms” to drive states toward compliance
(Neumayer). Eric Neumayer refers to this condition as the “low cost of noncompliance”, meaning there exists a minimal degree of political backlash for a state’s
refusal to obey treaty standards. This point is further demonstrated by the vast majority of
authoritarian states that sign onto human rights treaties as they do so easily and without
bothering to set up RUD’s , “because they have no intention to comply anyway”
(Neumayer). In contrast, liberal democracies wish to be viewed as taking their “domestic
human rights observance” obligations seriously and so will engage in the most RUD’s of
any government type. Human rights treaties are considered “more intrusive” than other
international treaties, because they aim to establish norms of governance in domestic law.
Liberal democracies “like any other nation-state, want to limit the extent of interference
with their sovereignty”, but must continue to be perceived as genuine human rights
champions. Therefore, “they are more likely to set up RUD’s to minimize the extent of
intrusion” to preserve sovereignty (Neumayer). From this it can be concluded that
RUD’s are put into place only in instances when a state desires to balance continued
sovereignty and an image of compliance. This then calls into question why the number of
reservations made by Islamic states to CEDAW is attributed overwhelmingly to religion
alone. What contributes to this perception and what if any are the unintended
consequences of this misinformation?
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To tackle these questions, this paper will consider the most heavily reserved
human rights treaty, from which stems much of the preconceived notions about the
reservation behavior of Muslim states (Mahalingam, 2004). “CEDAW represents the
most comprehensive statement regarding the political, economic, social, and cultural
rights of women, and thus presents a direct challenge to some of the most ardently held
views of militant Islamic fundamentalism” (Mahalingam). Of the seven major
multilateral human rights treaties, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) carries with it the largest share of RUD’s of
all. With 186 state parties and 139 RUD’s in total, more than one third of the member
states to CEDAW submitted a modification (Neumayer, 421). 51 reservations, including
7 that generally reserve or disregard an entire provision, were given by states with high
Islamic populations onto CEDAW prior to ratification (Krivenko, 2009). However, it is
vital to note that out of the 40 states that in some way currently incorporate Islamic laws
and practices in the world today, 36 are parties to CEDAW. From those 36 not all entered
reservations and not all made reservations mentioning, nor basing their reservation on a
desire to protect Islam or Shariah law (Krivenko). Therefore, claims that all Muslim
states react to CEDAW in a uniform way should be subject to scrutiny. To deny that
there is no such correlation between the numerous RUD’s registered and Islam would
also be equally foolhardy. It is then necessary to deconstruct the nature of these
reservations to determine to what extent the Islamic faith and Shariah are responsible for
creating an incompatibility with CEDAW.
Articles 2 through 6 of CEDAW, referred to as apart of the “General Part” of the
treaty, are the loosely defined provisions prescribing objectives “in general terms, ways
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in which State parties shall behave” (Krivenko, 2009). As stated earlier, general
ambiguity in it of itself welcomes reservation by States, as they must qualify for
themselves how these requirements will be interpreted at a domestic level. Though
considered a core provision of the convention, 9 Muslim States submit reservations to
Article 2, which requires states “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a
policy of eliminating discrimination against women”. The reservation of Bangladesh
reads, “The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as
binding upon itself the provisions of articles 2, […} and 16 (1) (c) […] as they conflict
with Sharia law based on Holy Quaran and Sunna”. Bangladesh’s statement irrefutably
invokes Islam, but of the states that enter RUD’s upon this article, it is the only one to
apply a religious justification broadly. Both Malaysia and Algeria refer to the sanctity of
their Federal Constitutions as reasons for reservation, whereas Algeria claims in its initial
evaluation report submitted to the Committee on CEDAW in 1998, “the rights of women
in Algeria are assured...by the provisions of the Constitution that guarantee equality of all
citizens…With respect to the adoption of legislation prohibiting all forms of
discrimination against women, the principle of equality between sexes is in itself
sufficient, since any law that is not consistent with that principle will be annulled by the
Constitutional Council”. Algeria also reserves article 2 to prevent conflict with its
Algerian Family Code. The Republic of Iraq makes no references to any legal or religious
institution, merely exempting itself from the provision. Because this article does not
decree specific legislative actions a state must undertake, the number of RUD’s is still
somewhat puzzling.
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Krivenko’s extensive work in this area reveals that reservations to article 2 are
merely a gateway to reservations to later provisions of the Convention. Reservations to
articles 9, 15, and 16 of the convention, unlike those to article 2, refer directly to specific
rights or provisions in law. “Should the reservations to articles 9, paragraph 2, article 15,
paragraph 4, and article 16 be removed, the reservation to article to 2 would no longer be
necessary” (Krivenko, 2009), which she proves to be true for Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Niger. In the language of its own reservation Bangladesh
states only “by deduction the reservation on Article 2 was placed”. Given this, further
analysis of article 2 becomes inconsequential. However, a pattern of differing approaches
from each state begins to fracture any conception of a unified Islamic front, be it a
cultural or moral perspective.
In contrast, the Special Part, articles 7-16 of CEDAW, indicates certain areas and
groups of rights guaranteed by the previous 6 articles featured in the General part.
These provisions aim to ensure equality for women in the arenas of Political and Public
Life, Representation, Education, Employment, Health, Rural Women, Economic and
Social Benefits. Interestingly, Muslim states did not overwhelmingly object to respecting
these rights, nor did the few that registered a reservation do so on any religious basis. As
a side note, of the eleven Muslim states that signed onto the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, none used Islam to reserve ratification. Articles 9, 15, and 16 make up
the majority of the reservations by Muslim States and deserve the most crucial attention.
Article 9 deals provisions for determining Nationality, Article 15 calls for equality of the
sexes before the Law, and Article 16 deals with legislating Marriage and Family Life
relations. Nothing could be considered more “intrusive” as Neumayer put it, to Islamic
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nations than demanding compliance with these sets of rights. The question then, does not
become do these States orient their arguments around the religious legalistic doctrines
and traditions of their laws, but whether such reservations are consistent across States—
as Shariah law and Islam know no geographical boundary and do not appear in the
reservations as being Morocco’s Islam or Egypt’s Shariah—and correspond with the
domestic laws within these dominions.
Bahrain, Brunei, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Syria, and
United Arab Emirates all had reservations to the nationality rights described in Article 9.
Nationality rights are protected under the Convention in that it requires State parties to
“grant women equal right with men to acquire, change, or retain nationality.” This is also
meant to avoid marriage implications on nationality standards in Muslim states, where a
woman’s nationality is dependent upon on her marital status. In addition, its second
paragraph grants women equal say in the nationality of their children. Only three of the
states, namely Iraq, Malaysia and, UAE entered reservations to the woman’s right to
determine her own nationality. Iraq’s reservation was to preserve its domestic laws
unrelated to Islam that revoke a woman’s citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner, if she
wishes to obtain the citizenship of her husband. “Moreover, according to Iraqi law, a
foreign woman who marries an Iraqi man acquires the Iraqi nationality” (Krivenko). As
of 1998, Malaysia has attempted to withdraw its reservation, which again objects to any
incompatibility with the Federal Constitution and Shariah law. The United Arab Emirates
cryptically states its view of the acquisition nationality as one considered “an internal
matter which is governed, and the conditions and controls of which are established, by
national legislation…” In sum, each state advances and utilizes differing arguments, two
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on behalf of domestic legislation, one on its constitution and religion. Such variance
further damages the association of treaty compliance in Muslim states as being entirely
influenced by religion. In objecting to determining a child’s nationality status, Bahrain,
institutes a general reservation, wishing to ensure implementation within the bounds of
Islamic Shariah. Brunei, like Malaysia expressed its reservations to those provisions “that
may be contrary to the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and to the beliefs and
principles of Islam”, but does so without prejudice which means it “is not motivated
by…Islam” (Krivenko). Kuwait “reserves its right not to implement…article 9…as it
runs counter to the Kuwaiti Nationality Act”, while Jordan seemingly blindly prattles off
articles it will not comply with. In 2006, Morocco announced plans to modify the
Moroccan Nationality Code to remove inequality and Egypt has at last been successful in
its attempts to withdraw its reservation, in keeping with modern reforms. If all domestic
relations are inextricably linked to Islam and thus immutable, how then is it possible for
several nations to reconsider and remove RUD’s from these provisions? The rhetorical
forms of these as well curiously invoke Islam yet State parties are shown to reserve under
secular terms.
Article 15 deals with equality of the sexes before the law, equality in civil matters,
the legal capacity and access of women to legal institutions. This includes the right to
conclude contracts, administer property, and equal treatment in “all stages of procedure in
courts and tribunals”. Particularly of interest is paragraph 4 of this article, which affords
women the same right as men to move freely and choose their residence. All the Muslim
states which maintained reservations to article 15 primarily reject the last right, but make
no move toward blocking a women’s right to legal equality. Again, these states differ on
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their approach to their reservation. Both Tunisia and Morocco only express
noncompliance with allowing married women to select their residence freely. “A married
woman must accompany her husband when he changes residence” in these states,
according to their domestic “personal status codes”. At the same time in Jordan, “women
are forbidden to travel alone…They must be accompanied by either a close male relative
or a group of women known for their integrity…[Islam] views a woman as belonging to
her husband, and as unable, whether married or single, to make an independent choice of
dwelling place.” As reflected in the periodic reports of the other Muslim states “and
according to their own interpretation”, Jordan is the only state to make this case. Views
upon marital status are also conceived and stressed differently, as Tunisia, Morocco, and
Niger as well do not restrict the behavior of unmarried women to choose residence or
move freely. On the other hand, Jordan proposes no distinction, merely banning both
practices for all women. Interestingly Jordan concedes that, “women can in fact include
in the contract clauses specifying place of residence…Some experts in fiqh
(juricounsults), notably theologian Abdelaziz Al-Khayat, consider that according women
the right to freedom of movement and to choose their place of residence is not contrary to
the Shariah, particularly since, as was stated above, women may set conditions on that
subject in the marriage contract” (CEDAW Country Reports, 2000). Domestic
implementation, in this instance then greatly contradicts the unwavering word of Islam as
Jordan characterizes it in its reservation, however deeper analysis of State laws will
follow.
Lastly, Marriage and Family relations are addressed in Article 16 so that State
parties “shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in

Dissanayake 11
all matters relating to marriage and family relations.” What CEDAW loosely outlines as
“appropriate” is the right to enter and choose marriages equally, execute dissolution of
marriage equally, to have say over the number of, planning of, and rearing of children
equally, custodial and adoption rights, the right to have possession, enjoyment, and
disposition of property equally, etc. Article 16 also affords personal rights and protections
to allow women to select the family name, a profession, whilst guarding against, child
marriages by creating a minimum age restriction. Before examining the reservations
made, it is important to note the sensitivity of this particular arena in the international
systemic level. Traditionally, human rights treaties shy from attempting to legislate what
is referred to in the vernacular as “the so-called private sphere”. In general as an
institution, law treats the public and private spheres distinctly, viewing the regulation of
the private as less essential (Krivenko, 2009). Using the United States as an example, an
ongoing debate continues upon the existence of privacy rights surrounding such
controversial issues as the right to choose, marriage equality, and government
surveillance. Therefore it can be concluded that intrusion upon sovereignty is at its most
precariously sensitive, when aiming to install equality mechanisms for marriage and
family relations in Muslim traditionalist nations.
Just as the other heavily reserved provisions of CEDAW, Article 16 demonstrates
that a wide scope of reactions exists from state to state in regards to each subsection.
Bangladesh reserves under Islamic Shariah 16 (c), the right to equal responsibilities in
marriage dissolution, Kuwait reserves 16 (f), equality in child guardianship and adoption
rights, and again Algeria offers a general reservation by only complying within the
parameters of the Algerian Family Code. Here these nations do not take issue with the
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same articles, or in the case of Algeria, do they even bother to specify what they find
objectionable. Bangladesh, elaborates further from their meager reservation description
by stating how inheritance laws function in the country and most notably, that first and
foremost “the Constitution is the fundamental source of law in Bangladesh and laws
incompatible with its provisions have no status”. Despite the rhetoric then, this ranks
Islam as a force secondary to the legal force of the State’s constitution as Bangladesh’s
ruler of determining compliance. Altogether, even a cursory analysis of the reservations
provided demonstrates that States vary from being entirely broad and only tangentially
basing their RUD’s with Islam, to narrowly citing chapter and verse of Shariah, to the
State constitution, or even another code of ethics unrelated to any religious or legalistic
institutions. No two States dispute the same sections of CEDAW in the same way or for
the same reasons, which firmly disproves the existence of a universal form of Islamic law
that can be interpreted in only one way. “These differences follow from the…degree of
incorporation of provisions of Islamic law into the legislation of each country and also
from different interpretations of the relevant provisions of Islamic law” (Krivenko, 2009).
Thus, each state has its own vision of Islam, governed by their own interpretations of
what Islamic texts mandate for them. Arguments then about an innate incompatibility
with Islam and women’s rights are also precariously placed, because less spiritual
cohesion exists between Muslim states. Now that Islam has been defeated as a uniform
doctrine in the international rights regime, the next step will be to inspect whether
domestic implementation of key states are in line with the reservations these states made.
Do these nation-states in effect, practice what they preach?
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The key states to examine the consistency of domestic implementation are those
that cite Islam as a faith or Shariah as a law in the State’s justification for noncompliance. Selecting these states heightens the likelihood that such governments will
have incorporated Islam in its State laws and will formulate arguments using Holy text or
Shariah law. Algeria, Bangladesh, Jordan, and Morocco will serve as the key states for
this purpose.
Algeria represents a case with legal system that corresponds to or has found some
genesis from Islam. The Algerian Family code and Constitution combine to form a quasiIslamic centered legal system. While “the constitution contains a mix of both secular and
Islamic references…Shari’a law is the only basis of the Family code” (Entelis, 1996).
Furthermore, “the two documents appear to set forth conflicting ideas on what position
women occupy in society” (Entelis). However, it is necessary to reiterate that in its 1998
periodic report to the Committee on CEDAW, Algeria has backed the provisions of the
Constitution as the mechanism with which to end discriminatory practices in Algeria.
“The rights of women are assured…by the provisions of the Constitution that guarantee
the equality of all citizens…Any law that is not consistent with that principle will be
annulled by the Constitutional Council”. Still, reservations were not made under
constitutional claims; they were recalled from the Algerian Family Code, which for all
intents and purposes is the State’s Islamic interpretation of Shariah (Entelis). In its
reservation to Article 15 (4), the Algerian state requested that it “should not be
interpreted in such a manner as to contradict the provisions of chapter 4 of the Algerian
Family Code”. Ta’ah, a Muslim wife’s duty of obedience to her husband as prescribed in
the Algerian Family Code, includes the need to obtain permission before leaving the
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home or to move freely as she pleases. Clearly this stands in direct conflict with the
Article 15(4), which holds State parties responsible for abolishing any practice that
restricts the free movement of women or their right to choose a residence. It is then, not
surprising at all that Algeria would provide a reservation on this count. In this instance,
we could simply conclude that state and religious doctrine appear one in the same if this
was the only level available to check consistency. But Algeria’s constitution does just the
opposite, in “Article 44 (of the Algerian Constitution): all citizens in possession of their
civil and political rights have the right to choose freely their place of residence, and to
move freely about the national territory. It also guarantees the right to enter and to leave
the country” applying in general scope to “men and to women without distinction”
(Krivenko, 2009). Interestingly, despite such divergence between code and con law, both
are still ever linked in the eyes of the government. By proclaiming Islam as the religion
of the State and outlawing any actions contrary to Islamic morality within the
Constitution, it defeats any notion that the Algerian government perceives itself as being
inconsistent with Islamic law (Entelis). From this then we can infer that Algeria has a
qualified constitutional interpretation of Islam that is capable of out rightly redefining
equality for women if it so chooses, but that Islam itself does not alone stand in the way
of that goal.
In framing its reservations, Bangladesh does not set limitations of compliance;
instead it completely rejects articles 2 and 16 of the Convention—although article 2’s
presence is as stated, negligible. “The Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh does not consider” these articles “as binding upon itself…as they conflict
with Shariah law based on the Holy Quaran and Sunna.” From this we can infer that
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Bangladesh finds the above provisions as wholly incompatible with Islam as the state
makes no effort to explicitly define its objections. But, like Algeria, this more direct
approach to preserve Islamic law ranks secondary to the state’s constitution. It is the
constitution, not Shariah, which “is the fundamental source of law…and laws
incompatible with its provisions have no status…and therefore deemed to be
automatically void.” Decisions of the Bangladesh Supreme Court support this view, in
often ruling in favor of liberal interpretations of women’s rights to afford greater gender
equality evident by State’s jurisprudence. The case of Nelly Zaman v. Guasuddin Khan
pitted husband and wife, whereas the husband sued for “forcible restitution of conjugal
rights against his wife who was also unwilling to live with her husband.” The court
rejected Mr. Zaman’s claim as violating “the accepted State and Public Principle and
Policy” and the Constitutional principle of equality. Another such decision declared
polygamous marriages to be against the precepts of Islamic law and moved toward
striking down the corresponding law that had previously upheld it. Protections for marital
sexual rights are encompassed in Article 16 of CEDAW and are the very same rights that
were considered inadaptable due to the Quran and Shariah. In truth, Bangladesh does not
even have a codified Shariah law per se, but it influences the procedure of the state’s
Muslim Family Law Ordinance. “Nevertheless, the law based on Islam is not regarded as
an immutable body of clear set rules, but as a set of guiding principles subject to
reinterpretation” (Krivenko, 2009). Implementation then at the State level does not agree
with the impermeable stonewall stance Bangladesh’s reservation seems to suggest.
Instead, there is room for Bangladesh to grow more open to gender equality and reforms
with time, regardless of the state of its formal reservations to the Convention.
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As mentioned earlier, Jordan entered its declaration onto CEDAW in almost a
grocery list fashion, that “Jordan does not consider itself bound by”… “Article 9,
paragraph 2; Article 15, paragraph 4; Article 16, paragraph 1, subsection (c), (d), (g)”
absent any religious or legal institution as justification. Despite its lack of elaboration,
however, it is still possible to determine whether or not Jordan functionally means to
maintain certain discrimination against women in these instances on behalf of Islam due
to the extensive information provided by periodic reports. Yet again, Jordan too defies
the interpretation it sets forth of Islam by granting women the right to choose their
residence and the ability to move freely, so long as it is entered by the woman in the
marriage contract prior to betrothal. Thus, mistaking Jordan’s RUD to Article 15 for
discrimination would be foolish as Jordan simply curtailed the meaning of free movement
and selection of domicile in terms that accord with the sovereignty of their laws. In fact,
Jordan’s periodic report issued in 1997 rejected the claim of cultural relativists that these
provisions of CEDAW must be rejected, because of the binding word of Shariah, the
Holy Quran, the Sunna, etc. According to Muslim scholars, Jordan reports, “[women’s]
right to freedom of movement and to choose their place of residence is not contrary to
Shariah…” as “…women may set conditions on” the marriage contract”. Additionally,
under Jordanian law, women have been capable of travelling freely since 1976.
Dissolution of marriage as well, which Jordan rejects in Article 16, is afforded the right
to equal responsibilities and benefits as men through the marriage contract. Jordan, more
explicitly utilizes Islamic rhetoric than many other states in setting up its reasons for not
fully ratifying CEDAW, yet still breaks with its declaration.
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The final key case rests with Morocco, which interestingly utilizes multiple
approaches by citing its Moroccan Code of Personal status as Algeria had its Code, Islam
and Shariah law as Bangladesh had, whilst describing in incredible detail the implications
of each RUD on the State as Jordan had done. Eager to advertise its progressive policies
to the West by way of appearing advanced on gender rights, Morocco became a party to
CEDAW in 1993 (Mayer, 1998). However, Morocco followed the lead of Egypt and
other fellow states, indicating its “duty to abide by Shariah law stood in the way of
adhering to international human rights law” through reservations, understandings, and
declarations. The Personal Status Code, Morocco asserts, grants “women rights that differ
from the rights conferred on men and may not be infringed upon or abrogated because
they derive primarily from the Islamic Shariah which strives, among its other objectives,
to strike a balance between the spouses in order to preserve coherence of family life.”
Months after this however, Morocco changed its Personal Status Code or “mudawwana”
to institute several women’s rights reforms that do no align with the interpretation of
Islam set forth in their declarations. During this period women gained the right to full
consent in marriage, revoking the guardian’s ability to create undesired arrangements. At
the same time, men lost the ability to unilaterally decide if the family household would be
polygamous (Mayer). The State has announced reforms the laws relating to declarations
on articles 9 and 15, which determine a child’s nationality and women’s freedom of
movement respectively. Regardless of the several reservations to Article 16, Morocco has
conferred upon women the right to dissolution in a Shariah court, with full retaining of
her properties. Although, men are still capable of acquiring divorce indisputably,
Morocco moved divorce proceedings to an open court forum to create greater equality
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(Mayer, 1998). By 2004, the Family Code removed more marital inequalities by setting
the age of marriage for both sexes to 18, a woman’s “guardian” was taken out entirely
from the contract process, and men are no longer deemed to the head of the household.
Since entering into CEDAW in 1993, Morocco has experienced continuing positive
change for Moroccan women that does not reflect the traditionalist view of Islam present
still in the reservations to the Convention. Whether such reforms go far enough is not at
issue here, as one can make the argument that countless nation-states have much to do
before systemic and domestic sexism disappears from the earth. However, inherent
sexism toward women is not an unwavering “Islamist” view either as both the
international state of affairs, nor as the laws of the Muslims states are immutable, ever
evolving with each interpretation. Because of the stark inconsistency between the
behavior and reaction of each state to each article, religion, though shared commonly by
these states, alone is an insufficient explanation to use in order to examine the
motivations behind these reservations.
As shown by this extensive study into the laws and reservations of the Muslim
states, we are able to conclude that there is a wide range of interpretive diversity between
states about what Islamic [text] sources mandate in terms of status for women, and that
reform is certainly not impossible in Muslim states (Mayer, 1998). Krivenko further
observes, “The most visible trend among [Muslim states] is to declare reservations to be
of a certain temporary nature...” and should be seen as “being mere indications of
concern” (Krivenko, 2009). These states employ this stall strategy to adapt CEDAW’s
provisions in accordance to its laws and sovereignty, just as other non-muslim state
parties are afforded a “certain margin of appreciation and …time”, but ought not be seen
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as permanent prejudice. In fact, the primary sources of Islamic law’s derivation from the
Quran, Shariah, and the Sunna “do not expressly or necessarily prohibit the right of
women to receive an education, to have access to healthcare, to work, to vote or even to
have an abortion. In each of these examples, there is no direct conflict between CEDAW
and Shari’ah” (Mahalingam, 2004). Sovereignty, then more so than religion, consistently
explains the behavior of each state in choosing to use reservations. Why then is there a
prevailing cultural relativist narrative in existence that purports to defend Islam as a
unified front incompatible with CEDAW? Where does the narrative originate from and
what is a potential consequence of disseminating this fallacy?
Surprisingly, the place from which the narrative developed in its most active form
is within the Muslim States themselves. Many Muslim countries—Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Libya, and Pakistan for example—claim that they do not accept human rights principles
as universal principles because, “Islamic religion mandates unequal treatment for
women”. At this point, this unilateral statement can be promptly discarded, as the Islamic
faith is quite complex and requires no such thing. Still these states attempt to construct a
narrative about the incompatibility of Islam with current international norms (Mayer,
1998). “These countries have taken a cultural relativist approach in defending their
reservations, arguing that CEDAW represents the active imposition of western secular
values or ‘cultural imperialism’ upon non-western countries. Reservations, they argue,
are therefore necessary to develop a better balance between maintaining national
sovereignty and respecting the general objectives of the Treaty” (Mahalingam, 2004). To
some extent this claim in not entirely unfounded.
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The human rights regime was born because of the resolve in the West to combat
the atrocities of World War II, and therefore its execution is undoubtedly Western. From
the conception of the international rights regime, Western countries have codified ideas
about individual rights, originating from European natural law philosophy, into the
international system (Entelis, 1996). Most strikingly is the notion of natural law, that
there is a state of nature where human beings are afforded inalienable rights from birth.
“A common idea in British and French philosophy was that individual rights should be of
utmost importance in a political system. Drafters of international human rights documents
thus grounded their ideas on these Western principles of individualism and protection of
individual rights”. In short, the human rights system has long promoted a universal view
not only on law alone but of morality, a concept dear to all major religions. The moral
ideals embodied in international documents, such as CEDAW or the International Bill
of Human Rights, are notions that stem from the West and to accept them would be to
accept the West’s morality as their own. By that virtue, resistance to the westernized
human rights regime seems only natural. Cultural relativism thus serves as another sphere
of preservation that Muslim States feel they must maintain within the international
system. Moreover, their use of religious rhetoric over the legalistic to enter the debate in
women’s rights perpetuates this distance between Muslim and non-muslim states.
Muslim states then have the arduous responsibility of juggling the preservation of its
sovereignty and morality in the international system. However, since CEDAW was
drafted in 1979, only 4 Muslim states have not signed onto the Convention. The 36
Muslim states that ratified CEDAW, all of which are also members of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that proclaims “to protect and defend the true image of
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Islam” (Krivenko, 2009). Therefore, their voluntary participation in an international
regime they decry as being imposing and incompatible to their own is intriguing. In order
to explain the consequence this, we return to Neumayer’s assertion of the “low cost of
compliance” for States (Neumayer, 2007).
With no appropriate mechanisms or adjudicative body to regulate CEDAW’s
compliance, the systemic pressure for Muslim states to comply at all is quite negligible
(Hamid, 2006). However, these countries went to great pains to go on record with
CEDAW on their positions despite no tangible loss. But like other liberal democracies,
doing so afforded them greater legitimacy (Neumayer, 2007). Consequently, Islam and
Shariah law will likely recieve more recognition as a valid international legal system.
This would occur in a manner similar to that which created the human rights system. The
codification of the Western human rights regime began with the creation of and collective
participation by the west to put into place a universal set of principles. Western ideals
became international law because of this process of affirmation by community consent in
drafting human rights protections (Entelis). The customary practice of the “unanimity
rule” that was mentioned previously functionally ensured that all parties entering a treaty
would agree to the full force of the agreement, just as any contract (Hamid, 2006).
Because human rights treaties lack reciprocity, mechanisms of compliance, and
specificity in legislation, the unanimity rule does not apply. However, another affirmation
process exists through “tacit acceptance”. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties makes a contracting party’s silent response to a reservation “tantamount to an
acceptance” unless the state expressly declares that the treaty is not in force between
them. Thus, when Muslim nations pronounce their belief that “because social and cultural
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differences exist, the international community should not expect non-Western states to
uphold the same standards” by using the same forum to voice dissatisfaction, “acceptance
by acquiescence” has an automatic legal effect (Hamid, 2006). Perhaps this is the reason
for many Islamic states modeling their reservations after other states, when their domestic
implementation strategies are so dissimilar (Mayer, 1998). Whether this consequence is
purposeful or not requires deeper study, but codification of Islamic principles by
“acquiescence” is very much a possibility at least in so far as it affects other Muslim
states, especially given the Committee on CEDAW’s efforts to accommodate and tailor
legislation for contracting Islamic parties in recent years. Cultural relativism may then
become moot as universal expectations arise for Muslim state behavior. In
conceptualizing and participating with other treaty documents, Muslim states have
already had such an impact on the international rights system (Waltz, 2004).
Breaking down this total analysis, we can now at last conclude that Muslim states
are not solely motivated by religion alone in the international human rights regime, nor
can it be claimed their religion is innately sexist. Due to the inconsistency of Islam and its
usage in the RUD’s from the 36 participating state parties with high Muslim populations,
this measure is quite insufficient in explaining or predicting how any given State will
behave toward the subjugation of women’s rights. Instead preservation of sovereignty fits
all cases as States would preemptively utilize reservation mechanisms to maintain
domestic implementation procedures either to buy time to initiate compliance or to
exempt itself from doing so. Further willingness to treat the State’s constitution above
Islam also demonstrates this. Additionally, Muslim states’ participation on the
international level is curious, as their formal opinions issued in the periodic reports to
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CEDAW consistently name cultural relativism as a justification for aversion to full
ratification. Still, by registering Islam, Shariah, and other related doctrines at the
international level, regardless, creates a degree of tacit acceptance or complicity with the
universality of Islam as another natural doctrine. As States withdraw their reservations
more and move toward reforming their domestic laws in the meantime, the Islamic
rhetoric will not disappear. These reservations have a sticky or frozen quality to them that
will forever affix Islam to them (Krivenko, 2009). Instead, as in Morocco for instance,
new interpretations of Islamic faith or Shariah may arise to meet demands for more
gender equality. Thus, by utilizing the international institutions laid out before by the
West, Islamic nations can as a consequence legitimate their philosophies in the same
forum.
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